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1 
DIGITAL GREENBACKS  
A SEQUENCED ‘TREASURY DIRECT’ AND ‘FED WALLET’ 
PLAN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DIGITAL DOLLAR 
Robert Hockett* 
Abstract 
I propose means of immediately converting the Department of 
Treasury’s existing Treasury Direct system of freely available transaction 
accounts into a publicly administered digital savings and payments 
platform. A platform of this type is an essential public utility in any 
commercial society such as our own. It is additionally growth-promoting 
inasmuch as growth-tracking Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a 
measure of transaction volume, while transaction volume is a function of 
more efficient and inclusive transacting. As Congress seeks means of 
streamlining the payments infrastructure in a time of pandemic-induced 
crisis, the Treasury route recommends itself as the fastest way to digitize 
payments for 95% of our citizens and business enterprises. I also map 
means of migrating the Treasury architecture to the Federal Reserve 
System (Fed) over time once the crisis is past—as the “Greenback” paper 
dollar itself did in the late 19th and early 20th centuries—and include my 
draft Treasury Dollar Act as an Appendix. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Facebook’s announcement of its Libra proposal in June of 2019, 
monetary authorities worldwide have redoubled their efforts to develop 
central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).1 These efforts were underway 
even before Libra, and for very good reasons. Facebook’s announcement 
accordingly did no more than accelerate already ongoing developments.2 
The sudden slowdown in productive activity worldwide brought on 
by the Coronavirus pandemic of 2020 makes matters more urgent. The 
social distancing measures necessitated by the pandemic are antithetical 
to productive activity—and, in turn, the pay people earn through 
productive activity.3 “Knowledge workers” might be able to collaborate 
remotely, but production line workers and delivery personnel cannot.4 
Economies worldwide are thus confronted by simultaneous supply side 
and demand side shocks.5 The U.S. economy is no exception—indeed it 
appears to be worst hit of all.6 
 
 1. See Robert Hockett, Facebook’s Proposed Crypto­Currency—More Pisces than Libra 
for Now, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/06/20/ 
facebooks-proposed-crypto-currency-more-pisces-than-libra-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/K9X8-
8GFU] (explaining that the world’s central banks are looking to upgrade their domestic and 
overseas payment systems by availing themselves of new technology). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Robert Hockett, An Immediate Relief Plan for Coronavirus-Related Economic 
Mitigation 4 (Cornell L. Sch., Research Paper No. 20-28, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567855 [https://perma.cc/5UPH-2THB]; Robert Hockett, Managing 
Coronavirus’s Economic Fallout—Demand and Supply Side Measures, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2020, 
1:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/16/managing-coronaviruss-economic-
fallout-demand-and-supply-side-measures/ [https://perma.cc/P9PZ-PRKJ]; see also Robert 
Hockett, We’re at War and Need Wartime Institutions to Keep Our Economy Producing What’s 
Necessary, THE HILL (Apr. 4, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/491166-
were-at-war-and-need-wartime-institutions-to-keep-our-economy-producing [https://perma.cc/ 
KC57-TK4H] (‘The virus . . . is threatening our way of life and destroying our productive capacity 
and economic health.’). 
 4. See Robert Hockett, White Paper: How to Mobilize the Military to Produce Pandemic­‐
Responsive Supplies in Adequate Quantity, NEW CONSENSUS 4 (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://newconsensus.com/files/pandemic-production.pdf; Robert Hockett, Our Corona 
Response’s Missing Ingredient—Mobilize the Supply Side!, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:29 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/18/our-corona-responses-missing-ingredient--
mobilize-the-supply-side [https://perma.cc/M7HJ-G36J]; see also Robert Hockett, The US Must 
Take Equity Stakes in the Companies it Rescues, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/86a333d0-6dc3-11ea-89df-41bea055720b [https://perma.cc/LS99-
6DDA]; Robert Hockett, The US Needs to Tackle the Coronavirus Pandemic with a Playbook out 
of the Great Depression and World War II, not the Financial Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 29, 
2020, 9:42 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-pandemic-us-should-ramp-up-
ventilator-mask-manufacturing-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/AM7S-FW89]. 
 5. See sources cited supra notes 3–4. 
 6. See sources cited supra notes 3–4. 
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To arrest, minimize, and reverse these shocks, simultaneous demand 
and supply side measures must be taken as quickly as possible. This 
means that our capacities to store and transfer value—to make and 
receive payments and disburse moneys—must be sped up as well.7 
Whatever we are able to do, both to optimize our payments architecture 
and to speed up that optimization effort, we must do. In so doing, we will 
not only optimize a pandemic response architecture but also optimize the 
payments infrastructure, with which we shall live and prosper long after 
the present pandemic is past.8 
Digital currencies are ideal means to this optimization. The reasons 
are straightforward. A currency is simply “that which pays” in a payment 
system and “that which counts” in a value accounting system.9 To design 
a digital currency is to design a digital savings and payments platform. It 
is to design a literal speed-of-light mechanism of value storage and 
transfer. It is to deliver a banking and financial architecture by supplying 
a commercial architecture, as is the case in any “commercial society” or 
“exchange economy” such as our own.10 
Fortunately, Congress is keen on this idea. Since late March, both 
Democrats and Republicans in both chambers have weighed proposals—
including one of my own to which this Article is devoted—to pass 
legislation on a digital dollar and associated system of digital wallets. My 
own Inclusive Value Ledger (IVL) Plan, which has colloquially come to 
be known as the Public Venmo Plan since its draft bill was proposed in 
the New York State Assembly and Senate last year, can be instituted by 
municipal, state, or national authorities, and can be administered by either 
the Fed or Treasury at the national level.11 
 
 7. See Robert Hockett & Lawrence Rufrano, Digital Dollars for All, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 
2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/digital-dollars-for-all-11586215100 [https://perma 
.cc/8TR9-BTDS]; see also Robert Hockett, Why Now for a Digital Treasury Dollar? Because 
Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2020, 8:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/ 
29/why-now-for-a-digital-treasury-dollar-because-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/EE7Y-643V]. 
 8. See sources cited supra note 7; see also Robert Hockett, Anshul Gupta & Lawrence 
Rufrano, A Digital Dollar – Why, How, and Why Now, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 18, 2020, 12:12 PM), 
https://venturebeat.com/2020/04/18/a-digital-dollar-why-how-and-why-now/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9JYZ-SHBJ]. 
 9. Robert Hockett, The Democratic Digital Dollar: A Digital Savings and Payments 
Platform for Inclusive State, Local, and National Money and Banking Systems, 10 HARVARD BUS. 
L. REV. ONLINE, 2019–2020, at 1, 2. 
 10. Id. at 4; see also Robert Hockett, The Capital Commons: Digital Money and Citizens’ 
Finance in a Productive Consumer Republic (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Hockett, Capital Commons]. 
 11. See generally Robert Hockett, The Empire State Inclusive Value Ledger: A Peer‐to‐
Peer Savings & Payments Platform for an All-Embracing and Dynamic State Economy (Cornell 
L. Sch. Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3470923 [https://perma.cc/FBE7-EKRB]. 
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For reasons rooted in both the “need for speed” and the need for 
inclusion in the midst of a pandemic, I aim with this Article to lay out my 
IVL Plan in both its Treasury and Fed renditions. The Treasury already 
possesses the requisite infrastructure for expeditious implementation and, 
partly for this reason, both Senators and Representatives in both party 
caucuses and in both chambers of Congress have been considering the 
plan since last March. There accordingly seems to be a need for a full 
discussion on the Treasury and Fed plans, their relation to one another, 
and their prompting considerations—including the simplicity and speed 
with which these plans, in comparison to others, can be sequentially set 
up and operated. This Article supplies these discussions. Part I provides 
background. Part II maps the Treasury plan. Part III charts the Fed plan. 
Part IV concludes and looks forward, while the Appendix includes a bill 
I have drafted for quick introduction and passage in Congress. 
I.  BACKGROUND: THE DEMOCRATIC DIGITAL DOLLAR, THE INCLUSIVE 
VALUE LEDGER, AND THE FED & TREASURY RENDITIONS THEREOF 
I will begin by first sketching the basic structure that I believe a 
maximally efficient digital payment platform and wallet system will 
require, along with my reasoning for the structure. I will borrow a 
metaphor from the automotive sector and call this structure the plan’s 
“chassis,” onto which any number of distinct “bodies” selected by any 
level of government can then be installed. 
A.  The IVL “Chassis” 
As noted above, my “Public Venmo” IVL Plan is already under 
consideration in New York. In the autumn of 2019 two visionary New 
York state legislators—Assemblyman Ron Kim and State Senator Julia 
Salazar—proposed legislation I had drafted to institute what I call a 
“Democratic Digital Dollar” and its associated “Inclusive Value 
Ledger,” or “Public Venmo” platform.12 In New York, we call it ‘The 
 
 12. Id.; Assembly: https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2021/A3138; Senate: 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s6792 A.B. A088686, 2019-20 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020), https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A08686&Summary 
=Y&Actions=Y&Text=Y. For a sampling of this author’s columns and op­eds on the plan, several 
co­‐authored with the legislators who have introduced it to the New York state legislature, see, 
e.g., Assemblyman Ron Kim & Robert Hockett, Dynamic Inclusive Money for a Dynamic 
Inclusive Economy, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 17, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/dynamic-
inclusive-money-economy/ [https://perma.cc/GHZ3-KQPD] (explaining why the economy must 
allow money to flow in a way that is ‘inclusive’); Robert Hockett & Ron Kim, Our New Currency 
for New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 28, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/ 
opinion/ny-oped-new-currency-for-new-yorks-poor-20191029-uevs4nbx7fdwtbrlzgerdos664-
story.html (explaining how the IVL will put money back into New York’s economy and create a 
more even distribution of funds); Robert Hockett, Ron Kim & Julia Salazar, Our Money’s Not 
Green Enough, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2019, 8:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/ 
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Empire State Inclusive Value Ledger Plan.’13  
Although this innovative legislation was introduced at the state level, 
the IVL Plan design is meant to function as a sort of “chassis” onto 
which any number of “bodies” can be installed at the local, state, or 
federal levels—not to mention counterpart levels in the Eurozone and 
beyond.14 At the federal level, it can be established and administered by 
either the Fed or the Treasury. 
1.  Basic Architecture 
The plan’s architecture is strikingly simple. It requires only two 
functional steps. First, every person and business receives a smartphone 
or smart‐device‐accessible digital wallet, with both (a) “vertical” 
connectivity to the public treasury and (b) “horizontal” (essentially P2P) 
connectivity to all other digital wallets.15 All wallet holders are then 
able “vertically” to pay taxes, licensing fees, and other remittances, as 
well as receive tax refunds, program moneys, and other disbursements 
over the IVL. Additionally, all users can “horizontally” make real time 
payments to one another.16 
 
11/12/our-moneys-not-green-enough/ [https://perma.cc/YKM2-F8A5] (describing how the IVL 
system will work); Helen Partz, Authors of New York’s P2P ‘Public Venmo’ Bill Hope for Greater 
Decentralization, COIN TELEGRAPH (Jan. 10, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ authors-of-
new-yorks-p2p-public-venmo-bill-hope-for-greater-decentralization [https://perma.cc/4WUZ-
L6LY] (describing how ‘new technologies’ will be used for the IVL); New York Digital Currency 
Proposed for P2P Payments, LEDGER INSIGHTS (Jan. 2020), https://www.ledgerinsights.com/new-
york-digital-currency-proposed-p2p-payments/ [https://perma.cc/59CZ-CA6N] (explaining how 
others are working to recreate economic ‘architecture’); Jordan Heal, New York Lawmakers 
Propose Statewide Cryptocurrency, YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/ 
news/york-lawmakers-propose-statewide-cryptocurrency-100001080.html [https://perma.cc/ 
WGZ9-7FXH] (describing the IVL cryptocurrency); New York Lawmakers Push for Public 
eBanking System, PYMNTS.COM (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/news/digital-
banking/2020/ny-lawmakers-push-for-public-ebanking-system/ [https://perma.cc/K2AX-8E59] 
(outlining the “push” for an online banking system in New York); Jordana Rosenfeld, New York 
Is Proposing the Creation of a ‘Public Venmo,’ VICE (Jan. 7, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice 
.com/en_us/article/pked9v/new-york-is-proposing-the-creation-of-a-public-venmo [https://perm 
a.cc/AW5E-VES7] (describing the IVL as a “public Venmo”). 
 13. See sources cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. On naming, one might envisage 
a comparable Lone Star IVL for Texas, a Crescent City IVL for New Orleans, a Continental IVL 
for the U.S., and so on. 
 14. See Robert Hockett, Open the Marriage to Save It: A Peer-to-Peer Savings & Payments 
Platform and Complementary Digital Euro Plan (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper No. 19-40, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470934 [https://perma.cc/W8EC-
TGXS]. 
 15. See Hockett, supra note 9; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10; Robert 
Hockett, Rousseauvian Money 7 (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper No. 18-48, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278408 [https://perma.cc/W6DH-7CJT] 
(discussing vertical and horizontal dimensions). 
 16. See sources cited supra notes 9–12. 
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2.  Pictographic Representation 
Diagrammatically, then, things look as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
























In the diagram, lines without arrows represent institutional linkages, 
while arrowed lines represent payment instructions and associated value 
flows. A payment occurs when the Payor instructs the Master Account 
Administrator, via a chip card, strip card, or smart device payment app 
(Payment Step 1), to debit her own wallet account in the Master Account 
and correspondingly credit the Payee’s wallet account in the Master 
Account (Payment Step 2).17 
At Implementation Stage 1 (the “vertical” stage) of IVL Plan 
implementation, counterparties in any such transaction will comprise one 
public and one private sector party. This is already possible through 
Treasury Direct Accounts as explained in Sections II.A.3 and III below. 
 
 17. I maintain a calculated ambiguity as among “wallets” and “accounts” throughout this 
Article for reasons rooted in fintech industry parlance. Pursuant to the latter, “wallets” hold 
“coins” that are legal tender, while “accounts” neither are nor “contain” legal tender, but instead 
represent liabilities on the part of account administrators to tender legal tender on account-holder 
demand. Where the issuer of the legal tender in question is also the administrator of the “account” 
in question, the distinction accordingly collapses—“wallet” and “account” then designate the 
same thing. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, for full discussion. 
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At Implementation Stage 2 (the “horizontal” stage) of IVL Plan 
implementation, all wallet account holders in the system, public sector or 
private sector, will be able to make and receive payments to and from one 
another in the same manner. This is all that need be added to Treasury 
Direct wallets to convert them to universally functioning value-storage 
(saving) and value-transfer (payment) media. 
B.  Virtues of the IVL Chassis 
There are a number of reasons, especially supplemented by recent 
crises-rooted needs, to put a proposal like the IVL Plan into place to get 
non-paper stimulus monies expeditiously to hard-hit American businesses 
and individuals.18 We can briefly discuss those reasons here. 
1.  Justice and Inclusion 
In any “exchange economy” such as our own, a payments system must 
be considered an essential public utility on a par with roads, sidewalks, 
and the national currency. Justice requires we make such utilities usable 
by all at no cost. Just as people do not pay to use sidewalks or dollar bills, 
they should not have to pay to use a digital payment system in an 
increasingly digitized exchange economy.19 
2.  Growth and Efficiency 
We measure the size and the growth of our economy by reference to 
transaction volume.20 That is all GDP is—a measure of transaction 
volume. It follows that a more seamless and efficient payment system, by 
enabling more rapid transacting and hence larger transaction volumes 
within any time interval, means greater growth and a larger economy over 
time. So does greater inclusion itself. Call this the growth or efficiency 
reason for IVL. 
3.  Fiscal and Monetary Policy (Including “Helicopter Money”) 
Transmission 
The presence of an IVL system, once in place, offers a host of 
collateral benefits. If administered by a nation’s fiscal or monetary 
authority—the Treasury or the Federal Reserve in the U.S.—it will enable 
 
 18. Paper is a very efficient vector of Coronavirus, which is why China has been literally 
laundering its paper money since February. Jesse Yeung, China is Disinfecting and Destroying 
Cash to Contain the Coronavirus, CNN BUS. (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/ 
17/asia/china-is-disinfecting-cash-coronavirus-intl-hnk-scli/index.html [https://perma.cc/H2JK-
ZNUH]. 
 19. See Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10; Hockett, 
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 15. 
 20. See sources cited supra note 19; see also Kim & Hockett, supra note 12. 
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faster fiscal stimulus or monetary policy transmission than our present 
system of middlemen, whom we hope will transmit inexpensive credit to 
consumers.21 Instead, we can drop digital “helicopter money” into our 
digital wallets, thereby sidestepping the notorious “pushing on a string” 
and diversion-to-speculative-use problems that hampered stimulus efforts 
in 2008.22 In less extraordinary times, we can even offer interest on 
savings in wallets, whereupon we can move those rates up or down when 
we must slow down or speed up spending activity economy-wide.23 
Indeed, we can even then “micro‐target” specific sectors of the economy 
where spending appears to be either overheating or dangerously cooling, 
another prospect considered below and more fully fleshed out in other 
work.24 
4.  Valuing Care Work 
An IVL system would also enable public authorities, including cities 
and states, to begin disbursing monetary rewards to “care work” 
providers and other contributors to the public good that our present 
payment arrangements render too difficult for most governments to 
adjudge feasible.25 A teenager who helps grade-schoolers with homework 
after school, for example, or someone who looks in on and cares for a 
“shut-in,” can quickly transmit digital proof of work (POW) to a city, 
state, or even federal social services authority and receive spendable IVL 
credits—what I call Democratic Digital Dollars, or 3Ds—in return.26 
Given the long-term savings to municipal, state, and federal budgets that 
 
 21. See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10. 
 22. See sources cited supra notes 9–10; see also Daniel Alpert, Robert Hockett & Nouriel 
Roubini, The Way Forward, NEW AMERICA (Oct. 10, 2011), https://www.newamerica.org/ 
economic-growth/policy-papers/the-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/2ZZQ-744G]. 
 23. See sources cited supra note 22. This is a prospect, incidentally, that might 
recommend—though certainly it does not mandate—migrating a Treasury system in time to the 
Fed, as discussed infra Section III.A. 
 24. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, How to Make QE More Helpful: By Fed Shorting of 
Commodities, BENZINGA (Oct. 14, 2011, 8:41 PM), https://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1988 
109/how-to-make-qe-more-helpful-by-fed-shorting-of-commodities [https://perma.cc/6G87-
DL32]; Robert Hockett, The Green New Deal: How We Will Pay for It Isn’t ‘a Thing’ – and 
Inflation Isn’t Either, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2019, 7:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/ 
2019/01/16/the-green-new-deal-how-we-will-pay-for-it-isnt-a-thing-and-inflation-isnt-either/ 
[https://perma.cc/7DZF-UTJV]; Robert Hockett, Pay for the Green New Deal Now or Spend More 
Later, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/046e7c30-23c8-11e9-b20d-5376 
ca5216eb. 
 25. See Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, supra note 11; Hockett & Kim, supra note 12, Kim 
& Hockett, supra note 12. 
 26. For examples of an IVL system’s disbursing monetary rewards to ‘care work’ providers 
and other contributors to the public good, see sources cited supra note 25. 
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such work demonstrably affords, crediting over the IVL is readily 
justified on long-term fiscal grounds, let alone ‘Good Society’ grounds.27 
5.  Data and Financial Privacy 
Finally, going digital offers financial data privacy benefits as well. 
Unlike private sector banks and many online payment service firms, 
public sector administrators of the IVL do not have a profit incentive—
there are no non-criminal “carrots” to entice data harvest and sale. Such 
administrators also are subject to Fourth Amendment constraints as state 
actors. unlike, say, Wells Fargo or Facebook—there is a “stick.” Adding 
more sticks through criminal law, moreover, along with especially hard 
encryption for all transactions in amounts lower than what we already 
require banks and other institutions to report under anti-terrorism and anti-
money laundering law, is easily done on an IVL system.28 
No matter how one looks at the matter, then, it seems clear we should 
do this. Commercial and financial inclusion, more rapid economic 
growth, leak-proof fiscal stimulus and monetary policy, valuing 
undervalued work, and tightening financial privacy . . . there seems little 
not to like. All such features, additionally, grow more attractive in times 
of crisis like the present. 
The real question, then, is who best to administer the IVL. Should it 
be cities, states, or our federal government? If it’s the latter, should it be 
the Fed or the Treasury?29 
C.  Federal Bodies for the Chassis—Fed or Treasury? 
In light of the present pandemic and the nationwide financial stresses 
to which it is giving rise, it seems clear that whatever New York and other 
states or their subdivisions might do, we will do better to install a federal 
body on the IVL chassis than to rely solely on those more jurisdictionally 
circumscribed units of government.30 The same reasons that underwrite 
this judgment seem to suggest also that the Treasury body would be 
preferable to the Fed body, at least in the short-run—even if we should 
decide ultimately to migrate the system over to the Fed, as we did with 
the paper dollar about a century ago.31 
 
 27. For support that crediting certain work over an IVL system is justified on long-term 
fiscal grounds in addition to “Good Society” grounds, see sources cited supra note 25. 
 28. For support that an IVL system can offer financial data privacy benefits, see sources 
cited supra note 25. 
 29. The Eurozone, of course, invites counterpart questions. Hockett, supra note 14, at 5. 
 30. See sources cited supra notes 1, 7–8. 
 31. Hockett et al., supra note 8. For more on that migration, along with the Greenback, see 
discussion infra Section II.A; see also Robert Hockett, Money’s Past and Fintech’s Future: 
Wildcat Crypto, the Digital Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & 
POL’Y 221, 228–30 (2019). 
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1.  Why Federal? 
The reason that I designed the IVL plan to be adaptable to local, state, 
and national use in the first place, stems in part from lessons I learned in 
the last crisis. In 2008, at the onset of a financial meltdown rooted in an 
underwater mortgage loan meltdown, I developed a plan that permitted 
public sector entities to employ their eminent domain authority to make 
compulsory purchases of underwater mortgage loans out of the private 
label securitization (PLS) trusts in which they were improvidently 
locked, then write them down and return them to the trusts.32 
These were loans that even trusts’ bondholders wished to see written-
down to avert default-prompted losses, as default risk lowered the 
expected values of mortgage loans by margins well below the level 
required to pull these loans back above water.33 The problem was that 
neither scattered bondholders nor their PLS trustees could do the writing‐
down on an adequate scale.34 For the pooling and servicing agreements 
(PSAs) pursuant to which PLS trusts had been settled, hastily drafted as 
they had been by lawyers who hadn’t foreseen the prospect of a 
nationwide housing price crash and associated default wave, did not 
allow it.35 If public authorities could partner with such bondholders to 
combine their own condemnation authority with bondholder money, I 
accordingly concluded, fair value condemnation awards could be paid at 
minimal or no public expense and the loans could at long last be written-
down and thus salvaged.36 
When it came to deciding what level of public authority to approach—
state, federal, or municipal—I thought it best to try all. Hard-hit 
homeowners, cities, and states that could not wait for the Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA) or any other instrumentality to act to forestall 
foreclosures, evictions, and associated financial turmoil, even if federal 
action was, ideally, preferable.37 In the end, then, while I started with 
federal officials and even Presidential candidates (then Senators Obama 
and McCain) in advocating the plan, it was ultimately hard-hit cities that 
 
 32. See Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution 
for Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., no. 5, 2013, at 1 (2013); Robert 
Hockett, We Don’t Follow, We Lead: How New York City Will Save Mortgage Loans Nationally 
by Condemning Them Locally, 124 YALE LAW J. 131 (2014). In effect, the plan was meant to 
enable PLS trusts to do what commercial banks, which were not subject to PSA­‐rooted 
impediments, were already doing in voluntarily writing­‐down portfolio loans in NPV­‐ positive 
manners to salvage their expected values. The plan simply added a step to that process 
corresponding to the added entity—the PLS trust—interpolated between debtors and ultimate 
creditors. 
 33. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 34. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 35. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 36. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 37. See sources cited supra note 32. 
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acted once it became clear that the new Obama Administration was only 
going to pursue piecemeal “cram-down” in bankruptcy courts rather than 
plenary “write-down” in Congress or at FHA.38 
In turning from the eminent domain plan to the IVL Plan several years 
after the mortgage loan crisis had finally receded, I kept the eminent 
domain plan experience in mind and accordingly started with our states 
and their cities at the same time that I approached federal officials and 
legislators, just in case. And while the anticipated case turned out to be 
the case for a time, with New York much quicker to act than was any 
other public authority,39 the present pandemic appears to have changed 
things where speed and exigency are concerned. Now it seems that both 
Fed and Treasury, as well as both caucuses in both houses of Congress, 
might be ready to act.40 The pandemic has denied us the luxury of waiting 
at all levels of government in our federal union.41 
2.  Why Treasury? 
Now as already noted, the federal rendition of the IVL Plan is 
adaptable to both Fed and Treasury use. The latter would simply add two 
functionalities to Treasury’s already existing network of Treasury Direct 
Accounts (TDAs), a long-standing but little known facility pursuant to 
which any citizen or legal resident of the US can already open a digital 
account through which to transact with Treasury in its own securities 
24/7.42 To convert this already existing platform into a universal digital 
 
 38. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 39. In this sense, contemporary New York might be likened to Governor Roosevelt’s and 
State Industrial Commissioner Frances Perkins’s New York, which pioneered many of the New 
Deal programs that Roosevelt and Perkins subsequently pushed as President and Secretary of 
Labor, respectively, of the United States. See Jessica Breitman, Frances Perkins, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.fdrlibrary.org/perkins 
[https://perma.cc/PW2D-Q69S] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
 40. Philip Rosenstein, COVID-19 Relief Could Be Catalyst for a Digital Dollar, LAW360 
(Mar. 26, 2020, 6:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257079/covid-19-relief-could-be-
catalyst-for-a-digital-dollar [https://perma.cc/TJQ2-URC7]. 
 41. Id. The author of this Article is in discussions with Congressional staff on both sides of 
the aisle in both houses of Congress. 
 42. TREASURYDIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/ [https://perma.cc/BP46-ZXWE] 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2020). For recent writing done by the present author on TreasuryDirect and 
possible Treasury Dollars, see, e.g., Hockett, supra notes 7–8; see also Robert Hockett, The 
Treasury Dollar: An Immediate Funding and Digital Banking Plan for Pandemic Relief and 
Beyond (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper No. 20-30), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567829 [https://perma.cc/5AQY-PTS3]; Hockett, How To Keep The 
Digital Dollar Democratic: A ‘Treasury Dollar Bill’ / ‘Treasury Direct’ Plan, FORBES (Mar. 24, 
2020, 2:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/03/24/how-to-keep-the-digital-
dollar-democratic-a-treasury-dollar-bill--treasury-direct-plan [https://perma.cc/G8KC-TW92]; 
Robert Hockett, The Democratic Digital Dollar: A ‘Treasury Direct’ Option, JUST MONEY (Mar. 
25, 2020), https://justmoney.org/r-hockett-the-democratic-digital-dollar-a-treasury-direct-option/ 
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payment platform, we would need to take only two simple measures, 
which is why the draft bill appended to this article requires fewer than 
three pages of legislative text beyond Findings and Definitions. 
The two steps, the first of which simply is Stage 2 of the IVL Plan 
schematized above in Section I.A.2 and Figure 1, are as follows: First, 
we add horizontal peer-to-peer (P2P) connectivity between TDA digital 
wallets to the current vertical connectivity between Treasury itself and all 
TDAs, as explained above in Section I.A.2. Second, we confer legal 
tender status on the Zero Percent Certificates of Indebtedness that 
Treasury already issues through TDAs—I call them Treasury Dollars, or 
Digital Greenbacks in honor of the national dollar that Treasury issued 
from the mid-1860s until the Fed’s establishment fifty years later.43 Even 
these two measures would be unnecessary if more than 75% of our 
population were banked because Treasury Direct already interfaces—
indeed, at present must interface—with traditional bank accounts. But 
because 25% of Americans are unbanked or under-banked while only 5% 
lack smartphones or comparable devices, these two tweaks would be 
important.44 
3.  Why—and When—the Fed? 
The other way to proceed—the alternative to building out Treasury 
Direct—would be to do something much like what I have just described 
but to do it through the Federal Reserve System instead, as elaborated 
below in Part IV.45 In the long run, this might be preferable since the Fed 
conducts most of our monetary policy and we might wish to keep it that 
way.46 In the short run, however, going the Fed route would be rather 
more difficult and, therefore, more time consuming—for the Fed, unlike 
 
[https://perma.cc/DZ4E-EH8D]; Robert Hockett, Money in Context: Part 2, LPE PROJECT (Apr. 
9, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/money-in-context-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/78JM-JBPJ]. 
 43. See sources cited supra note 42. The Greenback, incidentally, was virtually identical to 
the later Federal Reserve Note—same imagery and iconography, same size and material, etc. All 
that differed was the subtle inscription across the top, which of course did not read “Federal 
Reserve Note” until we migrated the Greenback over to the Fed after 1913. The Greenback 
history, incidentally, accounts for what might seem an idiosyncratic name that we continue to give 
to one of our primary bank regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), so 
named because this office in Treasury actually did once control the currency. See Hockett, supra 
note 31. 
 44. 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, FDIC 23, 
34 (Oct. 2018), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8C5G-EEXS]. 
 45. See discussion infra Part III; Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra 
note 10. 
 46. See Hockett, supra note 9, at 16; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10. It 
is also possible that we will in the future elect to consolidate some Fed and Treasury functions 
that now occur separately. I discuss what consolidation might look like at length in Capital 
Commons in particular. 
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the Treasury, has no preexisting network of wallet-convertible individual 
and small business accounts. 
My own view is that whatever we can do most quickly is what we 
should do now, with optimization to be addressed later.47 And if I am 
right in my conjecture that this means beginning with Treasury and only 
later migrating to the Fed—again as our nation’s first currency, the 
Treasury administered Greenback regime introduced in 1863, did in 
converting to the Federal Reserve Note regime 50 years later—then so be 
it.48 
As just suggested, both for the reasons adduced immediately above 
and for additional reasons adduced below, I think the Treasury route is 
best for now, with migration to the Fed to come only later, if at all, once 
the pandemic is past and the Fed is reformed on the basis of lessons we’re 
already learning.49 To the details of both plans I accordingly now turn, 
starting with Treasury and then proceeding to the Fed. 
II.  THE TREASURY DIGITAL DOLLAR AND TREASURY DIRECT PLAN 
Both for the reasons just noted and for additional reasons I lay out 
below, I think it best to debut the Digital Dollar as a Treasury Dollar or 
Digital Greenback, then migrate it over to the Fed, if at all, only after the 
present pandemic is past us. Here is how. 
A.  Digitizing Treasury Direct 
Few seem aware of the fact, but the U.S. Treasury already affords any 
citizen or legal resident who desires it a TDA with the Treasury itself. 
Through this portal, citizens and legal residents can purchase or sell all 
four of the principal classes of Treasury security—bills, notes, bonds, and 
 
 47. See Hockett, supra note 7; Hockett, supra note 8; A.B. A088686, 2019-20 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (pending bill in the New York State Assembly for creating a 
master account and system of individual wallets to make and receive payments to state entities 
and residents of the state); see also Hockett, supra note 12 (discussing the proposed Inclusive 
Value Ledger which would enable the free flow of money during coronavirus); Our New Currency 
for New York, supra note 12 (discussing the benefits of the proposed Inclusive Value Ledger to 
New York residents); Our Money’s Not Green Enough, supra note 12 (discussing how the 
Inclusive Value Ledger can dispose of the limitations on privately-run payment platforms); Partz, 
supra note 12 (giving a general overview of IVL and why it is being proposed); New York Digital 
Currency Planned for P2P Payments, supra note 12 (discussing the IVL proposal and the features 
of the ledger); Heal, supra note 12 (describing the features of the IVL and its purpose); New York 
Lawmakers Push for Public eBanking System, supra note 12 (describing the IVL as a solution to 
the millions of Americans who are excluded from the formal banking system); Rosenfeld, supra 
note 12 (describing IVL and distinguishing it from Facebook’s Libra cyprocurrency). 
 48. Hockett, supra note 31, at 6. 
 49. See generally Robert Hockett, Spread the Fed: Distributed Central Banking in Pandemic 
and Beyond (May 10, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597724 [https://perma.cc/T99G-WXT2]. 
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TIPS—at any time, 24/7. All that is needed is: (a) an internet accessible 
laptop, smartphone, or other device; (b) a Social Security or Taxpayer ID 
number; and (c) a bank account out of which payments for, and into 
which redemptions of, Treasury securities can be made. 
All that is needed to make this a full Treasury-administered 
Democratic Digital Dollar and IVL, then, is to add one new Treasury 
security endowed with legal tender status—a kind of digital cash—to the 
basket now offered and to establish horizontal connectivity between 
TDAs to supplement the vertical connectivity between these accounts and 
the Treasury by making them P2P-interactive. 
Here, then, is the nucleus of what can be quickly scaled up into a 
national savings and payments platform administered by Treasury during 
the pandemic, then perhaps migrated over to the Fed when there is time 
to build out the Fed’s digital infrastructure. I will begin with functional 
requirements, then turn to technical requirements. 
B.  Functional Requirements 
Because Treasury Direct is already halfway there en route to a full 
digital dollar and payment platform, the functional adjustments requisite 
to conversion are simple and straightforward. 
1.  Digitize Treasury Direct Accounts 
First, the Treasury will be explicitly authorized and indeed required to 
either: (a) allow digital dollars (digital Federal Reserve Notes) to be held 
in and spent from TDA Wallets, or (b) issue a new denomination of 
Treasury bill with no coupon or maturity date and a face value of $1. 
We’ll call it a Treasury Dollar Bill (TDB) or Digital Greenback (DG). 
There is a sense in which Treasury already administers the seed of a TDB 
or DG: The Zero-Percent Certificate of Indebtedness (in Treasury 
shorthand, the “Zero-Percent C of I,” or “C of I,” and in my parlance 
“Zero-CI”) is a Treasury security that does not earn any interest. It is 
intended, according to the Treasury, to be used as a source of funds for 
purchasing eligible interest-bearing Treasury securities in TDAs.50 
Treasury arguably already possesses authority to digitize Treasury Direct 
in this manner and even to issue a new legal tender Treasury Dollar. But 
“helicopter drops” into new starter accounts would require explicit 
Congressional appropriation, so we might as well explicitly authorize and 
indeed mandate the new issuance in the same initial appropriation 
legislation. 
 
 50. TreasuryDirect Help: Zero-Percent Certificate of Indebtedness, TREASURYDIRECT, 
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/help/TDHelp/help_ug_152-CofILearnMore.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/9RXC-7V4K] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
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The Treasury-Dollarized Zero-CI will effectively be a one-dollar 
perpetual, a.k.a. consol, much like the Federal Reserve notes we call 
dollar bills. Treasury will directly convey Congressionally determined 
amounts of these Treasury Dollar Bills, which I will call “Starter 
Deposits,” to holders of TDAs, which can be digitized into digital wallets 
as described below. There will be no need, then, to ‘sell’ these Bills to 
convey them—a critical difference from other Treasury issuances. Starter 
Deposits, perhaps started with CARES Act style disbursements or “Baby 
Bonds” of the kind contemplated by sundry developed nations in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, then can be periodically supplemented by what 
we will call Supplemental Deposits as Congress determines.51 We can 
also cap digital TDB amounts held in TDA wallets, if we wish, as 
Treasury itself used to cap Zero-CIs. All else being equal, I would not 
myself favor such capping, but all else might not be quite equal.52 
Existing banks and payment companies might object to unlimited TBD 
amounts, for example, for fear of being rendered superfluous by a once 
again solely publicly issued payment medium. Financial stability 
imperatives might operate to similar effect—if, say, mass migration of 
deposits from private sector banks to digital TDA wallets would suddenly 
drain most of the banking sector’s liquidity base.53 
The latter danger could, of course, be well mitigated, if not eliminated, 
through Treasury lending to banks in the same dollar amounts as migrate 
from bank accounts to TDA wallets.54 But that might take a while to work 
out, not to mention to work out to the satisfaction of frightened bankers. 
So, I suggest that we start TDA wallets simply with such future stimulus 
payments of the CARES Act variety as we make available for the 
remainder of the present pandemic, or with Baby Bonds as noted above.55 
Treasury Direct wallet accounts holding TDBs will be much like 
accounts held with present-day money market mutual funds (MMFs), 
save that they will be sovereign issuances with all the guarantees thereof. 
TDBs will, for their part, be reminiscent, again, of the Greenback dollar 
bills that the Treasury issued as the nation’s primary currency from the 
mid-1860s until early in the 20th century—when the Fed was established, 
and Fed Notes began to supplant Treasury issuances as primary 
currencies.56 Hence my suggestion of Digital Greenbacks is an 
alternative name for TDBs. 
 
 51. See Robert Hockett, A Republic of Owners, YALE U. PRESS (forthcoming 2021) 
(discussing Baby Bonds as piecemeal asset-spreading policies). See generally Robert Hockett, A 
Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005); Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act or CARES Act, S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 52. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, for more on when to cap and not to cap. 
 53. See id., for full consideration of such prospects and means of mitigating them. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See sources cited supra note 51. 
 56. See Hockett, supra note 31. 
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2.  Make TDBs Legal Tender 
Second, if we do not mandate the permission of TDA Wallets to hold 
digital Federal Reserve Notes, then, through legislation, we will mandate 
either: (a) that henceforth Treasury Dollar Bills will be legal tender on 
the same footing as Fed dollar bills, or (b) that the Fed will open 
individual deposit-cum-transaction accounts—we will call them Fed 
Transaction Accounts (FTAs)—for all who have TDAs, with free 
transferability of funds between each pair of twinned Fed Transaction and 
TDAs.57 Any and all such accounts will be digitized into smart-device-
accessible digital wallets as we upgrade the national payments 
infrastructure as most developed nations are now planning to do.58 
TDBs will thus constitute Congressionally determined helicopter 
money that functions alongside garden-variety Fed-administered money. 
Of course, the Treasury will coordinate with the Fed to prevent undesired 
inflationary impacts.59 Because what occasions helicopter drops is 
essentially by definition a significant contraction, however, this seems 
unlikely to become an issue.60 
3.  Add Horizontal P2P Connectivity 
Third, we supplement the currently open vertical connectivity channel 
between the Treasury and TDA wallet holders with universal P2P 
horizontal connectivity among all TDA wallet holders themselves.61 We 
do that either between TDAs themselves, in the event that we opt for 
Option (a) just above, or between FTAs, in the event that we opt for 
Option (b) above. Again, then, TDAs or FTAs will become digital 
wallets, out of which anyone can pay anyone else for anything legally 
sold and into which anyone can be paid by anyone else for anything 
legally sold or conveyed. 
As in my Democratic Digital Dollar and IVL plans more generally, 
private sector banking institutions can also be required, as a condition of 
licensure, to be among those businesses with what I call horizontal 
connectivity to TDA wallet holders. In that capacity, they can be required 
to offer full, fee-free access to teller windows, ATMs, and all other 
facilities at which anyone might wish to convert TDBs into Federal 
Reserve Notes (FRNs), coins, or any other form of legal tender cash we 
 
 57. For more on the prospect of Fed-administered digital dollars, see discussion infra 
Section II.C.4; Hockett, supra note 31; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10. The latter work 
also discusses previous digital dollar and non-digital Fed account proposals proffered by various 
friends and colleagues of the authors since 2014. 
 58. See infra Section II.C.4; see also sources cited supra note 57. 
 59. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, for a detailed design for Fed and 
Treasury coordination and even partial consolidation can be found in. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See sources cited supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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might ever include among our money forms. But of course, this added 
feature can also be forgone if Congress fears backlash from bank 
lobbyists. 
4.  Build-In Cryptographic Privacy Protection 
Fourth, we will cryptographically protect all TDAs or FTAs, and all 
transactions performed with them. We should also guarantee cash-
reminiscent anonymity of transacting for all transactions in amounts not 
already required to be reported to bank regulators under current bank 
privacy and money laundering enforcement laws. Violations of these 
protections by any government official will not only constitute Fourth 
Amendment violations, but will also be legally prosecutable—as, of 
course, will be any breaches by hackers or other miscreants. Because the 
Treasury, unlike private sector banking institutions and payment service 
providers, is not actuated by a profit motive, security and data protection 
seem likely to be easier assured on the new Treasury Direct system than 
they are now. But there is no need to leave this to chance. 
5.  Later, Consider Adding Interest on Accounts or Migrate to Fed and 
Do Same 
Finally, once the system is fully up and running, we might commence 
paying interest on funds held in TDAs or FTAs in the future, just as the 
Fed now pays interest on reserves (IOR) to banks holding accounts with 
it and as private sector banks pay (minimally) on checking and savings 
accounts held with them.62 One reason for doing this is that it will afford 
our monetary authority—be that the Fed, Treasury, or a consolidated 
fiscal and monetary authority such as that I design in other work—a direct 
and hence very effective monetary policy tool. Rates can be raised 
immediately to slow spending, and can be lowered to boost spending, 
rather than changing them indirectly through bank rate policy.63 
Should we go this route, in other words, there will be no more pushing 
on a string problems or other leakages in monetary policy transmission. 
Nor need we hope banks will lend or hope people will borrow in crises.64 
We will simply drop money in when we must, soak it back up other 
ways—raising rates higher, impounding some funds, or raising taxes if 
necessary.65 As CPI inflation seems to have been lower than policy 
targets for decades now, though, that seems a fairly remote possibility.66 
We shall soon see whether productivity-drops owing to social distancing 
 
 62. See sources cited supra notes 9–10, 31 and accompanying text, for more on this 
prospect, why it might be considered attractive, and how it might be employed. 
 63. See sources cited supra note 62. 
 64. See sources cited supra note 62; see also Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 22. 
 65. See sources cited supra note 62. 
 66. See sources cited supra note 62. 
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during the pandemic will increase CPI inflation to meet or exceed policy 
targets.67 
C.  Technical Requirements 
What, more specifically, does the technology look like for converting 
Treasury Direct Accounts into Treasury Dollar wallets for citizens, legal 
residents and businesses, without requiring them also to maintain 
separate private sector bank accounts? It is, believe it or not, not at all 
complicated. There are several key layers of any such system, and only 
one has yet to be built. 
1.  The Account Layer 
First is the account layer. There must be safe, secure accounts that 
have reliable “know your client” (KYC) identity authentication protocols. 
These accounts are what function as users’ virtual wallets, in which users 
can safely store, from which they can send, and into which they can 
receive digital dollars. They are essentially bank accounts with smart 
device keypads instead of brick-and-mortar storefronts. Critically, wallet 
holders have instant access to their funds, which is not the case with 
Venmo, PayPal, or other already existing private sector payment 
platforms that depend upon multi-day automated clearing house (ACH) 
operations to finalize payments. TDAs already possess most of these 
features, and can be readily upgraded within weeks or days, not months 
or years, to complete the replication.68 
2.  The Payment Layer 
Second is the payment layer. There must be a real-time capacity 
allowing for simultaneous debiting of payor accounts, and crediting of 
payee accounts, if wallets are to outperform traditional bank or payment 
accounts along with the ease and speed of transacting dimension. The 
Federal Reserve, as is by now widely known, is developing such a 
system, “FedNow,” for clearing between banks—a welcome 
development, but one whose completion (a) stands to benefit only banks 
and those holding bank accounts, and (b) for reasons unknown, is 
continuously postponed by the Fed.69 Treasury can readily supply the 
same among all Treasury Direct wallets, and more quickly—the 
 
 67. See sources cited supra notes 3–4, for a discussion of pandemic‐wrought supply side 
dangers. 
 68. A surprising multitude of this author’s friends and colleagues in the tech sector, 
amusingly enough, use precisely the same phrase in this connection—a “piece of cake.” Special 
thanks, incidentally, to Anshul Gupta, with whom I have worked for a long time indeed in getting 
the tech design right. 
 69. See FedNow Service, FED. RSRV., https://www.frbservices.org/financial-services/ 
fednow/index.html [https://perma.cc/LG8U-45KW] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
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technology, again, has long been familiar in the financial technology 
industry.70 
3.  The Application Programming Interface Layer 
Third is the application programming interface (API) layer. This 
enables interoperability between the system being developed on the one 
hand, and various verified 3rd-party services, including PayPal, Venmo, 
merchant POS systems, and cross border payment services on the other 
hand. These integrations will be desirable insofar as there continue to be 
other ways to send money to friends, family, and businesses—which we 
might well desire for purposes of at least some resilience-assuring 
redundancy in the payments system. But it is worth also bearing in mind 
that the upgraded Treasury Direct system is meant to enable costless 
payments among all parties who pay or are paid in legally permissible 
transactions, such that any other systems out there are strictly speaking 
unnecessary, even if desirable for some purposes. 
4.  The Ledger Layer 
The final layer is that of the ledger—in this case, the Treasury Direct 
accounting system as a whole, as administered by the Treasury. There 
must be a transaction-aggregation locus and a node through which to 
inject Treasury Dollars into the money supply for purposes of recipient 
self-maintenance and macroeconomic stimulus. The ledger can be 
distributed and thus grounded in blockchain technology, or can be 
centralized, as Treasury Direct is now. If we ultimately decide to go the 
former route, then we might see some increased complexity in 
implementation as we make architectural decisions concerning encoding 
keys, hashing, and hot/cold storage. Yet the underlying functionalities 
and requirements do not change, and in any event, we can convert 
Treasury Direct as currently constituted to P2P use without having to 
wait. Then any subsequent move to a blockchain or other distributed 
ledger technology (DLT) can be planned and executed at our leisure. 
5.  It’s Not That Difficult 
The technology involved in a Treasury Direct upgrade is, then, not 
trivial to build, but neither is it daunting or especially challenging. The 
requisite conversion involves technology with which both the industry 
and other agencies of our deferral government are well familiar. Indeed, 
the latter already has departments whose personnel are charged precisely 
with performing the very tasks just elaborated. One is the United States 
Digital Service (USDS), which is housed in the Executive branch of our 
 
 70. Supra note 68. 
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federal government.71 Others are—unsurprisingly when you think about 
it—the Internal Revenue Service, itself housed in Treasury, and the 
Social Security Administration. While we might (or might not) wish to 
consult with private sector experts, then, in tweaking the Treasury Direct 
system into a network of digital wallets, it is noteworthy that we need not. 
D.  Pictographic Representation 
In any event, the upshot once we are through will look as depicted in 
Figure 2, which the reader will note is isomorphic to Figure 1 above. 
 
Figure 2: U.S. Treasury-Administered TDA Payments System 
 
In the diagram, non-arrowed lines again represent institutional 
linkages and arrowed lines represent payment instructions and associated 
flows. A payment occurs when the Payor instructs the TDA Account 
Administrator, via a chip card, strip card, or smart device payment app 
(Payment Step 1), to debit her own wallet account in the TDA Master 
 
 71. See US DIGIT. SERV., https://www.usds.gov/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
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Account and correspondingly credit the Payee’s wallet account in the 
TDA Master Account (Payment Step 2). 
At Implementation, Stage 1 of Plan Implementation, counterparties in 
any such transaction will comprise the Treasury and one private sector 
party—that is effectively what is possible through Treasury Direct 
Accounts now, albeit not yet in Treasury Dollars or Digital Greenbacks, 
which I am proposing to institute. At Implementation Stage 2 of Plan 
Implementation, all wallet account holders in the system, public or 
private, will be able to make and receive payments to and from one 
another in the same manner. This is all that need be added to Treasury 
Direct wallets now to convert them to universally usable value storage 
(savings) and transfer (payment) media. 
III.  THE DIGITAL FED DOLLAR AND FED WALLET PLAN 
While Treasury Direct seems the obvious route to go in digitizing the 
dollar in the short run, we might nevertheless wish to migrate any national 
rendition of the IVL system over to the Fed in the long run. The primary 
reason for doing so would be to keep the digital dollar fully integrated, 
under one administrator, with the nation’s broader monetary policy 
apparatus and payments system—both of which are presently conducted 
and administered respectively by the Fed.72 
This need, not to mention objections from the banking sector, might 
be less pronounced if TDA wallets were limited to low threshold ceiling 
amounts, but would grow if those ceilings were raised or eliminated. 
Similarly, if the Treasury Direct system is only sporadically used—for 
example, only for occasional and infrequent helicopter drops during a 
crisis—it also could presumably stay within Treasury, which could 
simply make certain to coordinate closely with the Fed during these ad 
hoc intervals as it always does in such circumstances.73 This should in 
theory present no more difficulty than does the fact that there already are 
many bank deposit substitutes that the Fed must monitor even while not 
directly controlling them.74 
If, on the other hand, we wish to maintain an ongoing digital dollar 
system making use of wallets free of any ceilings, then there will be at 
least some reason, even if not necessarily a dispositive reason, to migrate 
it over to the Fed—again rather as we did when we gradually replaced 
the Treasury Greenback regime, our first ever and principal paper 
currency system from the late- mid- 19th century to the early 20th century, 
 
 72. See Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, supra note 31; Hockett, Capital Commons, supra 
note 10, for full discussion of present arrangements, why we have them, and why if at all we might 
wish to alter them. 
 73. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 74. See sources cited supra note 72. 
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with the virtually identical Federal Reserve Note after 1913.75 The dollar 
system as now constituted represents a portion of the liability side of the 
Fed balance sheet—hence the term “Note,” which abbreviates 
“Promissory Note,” which we find atop all dollar bills.76 And to these 
liabilities correspond assets.77 
In theory, the Treasury could borrow from account holders willing to 
credit the Treasury through their TD Wallet Accounts just as the Fed in 
accounting terms borrows from dollar holders. It could even pay a coupon 
on such credits—in effect, interest on digital dollar deposits—in a manner 
that renders them functionally equivalent to both (a) Fed Reserve 
Accounts that now pay out Interest on Reserves (IOR) to banking 
institutions, and (b) Treasury Notes, Bills, and Bonds that pay out a 
premium to investors.78 This would carry the Treasury well into the realm 
of central bank monetary operations, however, the full ramifications of 
which exceed the scope of interest of this Article though not of other 
work done by the  author.79 
The reader is accordingly asked simply to bear in mind that the 
functionalities of the Fed rendition of the IVL Plan—let’s call it a 
FedWallets plan—that I shall now sketch all could in theory be 
discharged by the Treasury or a single consolidated authority performing 
all of the functions now separately distributed over our fiscal and 
monetary authorities, but in practice would then require we make basic 
structural changes to Treasury practice and associated accounting.80 
If one day the U.S. should decide that central bank independence has 
been oversold and should be diminished or parted with, some such 
consolidation of funding, money-modulating, and liability-issuing 
authority might well be affected as it was in other eras of our nation’s 
financial history.81 For the present, however, the plan-sketching proceeds 
on the assumption that the nation retains separate fiscal and monetary 
authorities—that is, a separate Treasury and Fed. 
A.  Why We Might Migrate 
A FedWallet rendition of the IVL Plan could either replicate the 
Treasury rendition and administer it as a separate functionality in parallel 
with the Fed’s other functionalities or could integrate the Treasury into a 
more ambitious programmatic. The latter option would employ the IVL 
Plan not only as a national payments platform, associated Democratic 
 
 75. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 76. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 77. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 78. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 79. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 80. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 81. See sources cited supra note 72. 
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Digital Dollar, and public option for traditional retail banking—that is, 
value storage and transfer as outlined above—but also as an architecture 
for a far more effective channel of monetary policy and even more 
national investment than we have now.82 
In the case of monetary policy, which central banks and monetary 
authorities traditionally conduct with a view to maintaining balance 
between money aggregates and productive potential, the Fed transacts 
with publicly favored “dealer banks” and other privileged financial 
institutions to effect policy.83 It (a) buys or sells Treasury securities in 
such transactions to grow or shrink monetary aggregates, (b) changes 
interbank lending charges to affect money rental rates and hence credit-
money aggregates, (c) alters capital requirements to alter the quantum of 
credit that financial institutions can emit in monetized form, or (d) 
employs a combination of such tactics.84 
In all such cases, the hope is that Fed monetary easing will translate 
into greater bank lending to productive and other needful units throughout 
the national economy, or that counterpart monetary tightening will 
similarly contract credit-money aggregates and thereby slow inflationary 
spending activity. The problem is that the hope sometimes goes almost 
entirely unfulfilled and always goes less than fully fulfilled. The reason 
is not hard to find once one notes the pervasiveness of recursive collective 
action problems in any decentralized exchange economy and associated 
financial system like that of the U.S.85 
During a bust, with prices falling, it is irrational for individuals to 
borrow and spend, even when the slump could be reversed were all 
individuals to borrow and spend simultaneously in concerted fashion. 
Such individuals lack the means of collective agency required to ensure 
that all individuals do engage in the requisite spending, however.86 
During a boom, in turn, with prices rising, it is likewise irrational for 
individuals not to borrow and spend, even when their all doing so inflates 
the bubbles that ultimately burst and become busts.87 Private sector 
lending institutions are as caught up in this individually rational, 
 
 82. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 83. See sources cited supra note 72; see also Hockett, Rousseauvian Money, supra note 15, 
at 49. 
 84. Hockett, supra note 9, at 16–17; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10; 
Hockett, supra note 31. 
 85. Hockett, supra note 19, at 17; see also Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action 
Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Money Markets, Macroeconomies, 
and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSPS. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Recursive Collective Action 
Problems] (explaining what constitutes a recursive collective action problem and how to address 
those challenges). 
 86. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 85. 
 87. Id. at 18. 
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collectively irrational logic as are their prospective borrowers.88 A 
money-modulatory system that depends on the independently-reached 
decisions of such institutions will accordingly lack the means of 
collective agency required to conduct monetary policy efficiently.89 
A similar individually rational, collectively irrational logic afflicts 
national investment in much productive industry and infrastructure.90 
Many productive projects, whose value-adds inure to the benefit of large 
populations over lengthy temporal durations, do not inure sufficiently to 
the benefit of individuals over short temporal durations to induce them 
optimally to engage or invest in the productive activity in question.91 It 
is thus individually rational for disaggregated and uncoordinated persons 
simply to leave long-term value on the table, as collectively irrational as 
that is.92 And once again, what is true of individuals here is likewise true 
of the disaggregated profit seeking, private sector institutions that lend to 
them, whose “short-termism” is individually rational under present 
disaggregated and uncoordinated arrangements, even while collectively 
wasteful and even disastrous in the longer term.93 
These two collective action impediments to efficient money-fueled 
productive activity can be readily remedied by limiting the role of 
disaggregated middleman institutions in the monetary policy effectuation 
process, leaving them to retail lending against a backdrop of publicly 
modulated and hence stable money and credit aggregates economy-
wide.94 And a Fed-administered rendition of the IVL Plan affords ready 
means of doing just that—means of enabling the Fed fully to discharge 
its role as our polity’s authorized collective agent in matters monetary.95 
This is readily demonstrated in respect both of monetary policy and of 
infrastructure investment policy. 
The monetary policy case is the easiest to see in light of the foregoing 
schematization of digital IVL Accounts and associated digital dollars. All 
that the Fed needs do is: (a) pay interest on IVL Accounts; (b) raise those 
rates to slow down, and lower them to speed up, spending activity by 
account holders; and (c) in extreme cases, either impose negative interest 
rates upon, or conduct direct digital helicopter drops into, these same 
accounts. And that would be that—direct, leak-proof monetary policy, 
 
 88. Id. at 18–19. 
 89. Id. at 19. 
 90. See Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10, at 33–38; see also Hockett, Recursive 
Collective Action Problems, supra note 85, at 20. 
 91. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 85, at 20; see also 
Hockett, supra note 11. 
 92. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 85, at 20. 
 93. See sources cited supra note 72; see also Robert Hockett & Saule Omarova, Private 
Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437 (2018). 
 94. See Hockett, supra note 9, at 18. 
 95. Id. at 16. 
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and associated effectuality where expansionary and contractionary policy 
alike are concerned.96 
The investment policy case is slightly more complicated than is the 
monetary policy case, if only because the necessary architecture in this 
case has not already been fully laid out as it was for the monetary policy 
case earlier in this Article. It is nevertheless easy enough to describe 
quickly what is needed and then diagram the result. The key point to 
remember is that the Fed, like any financial institution, maintains a large 
and complex balance sheet comprising many classes of assets and many 
classes of offsetting liabilities. The Fed uses this balance sheet somewhat 
in the way that Congress uses the Internal Revenue Code—as a means of 
policy-optimal macro-allocation economy-wide.97 
Among the Fed’s liabilities are the Reserve Accounts that it maintains 
for private sector banking institutions, which operate much as do 
individuals’ deposit accounts maintained with these private sector banks 
themselves. Among the Fed’s assets, in turn, are the trillions of dollars’ 
worth of Treasury securities, mortgage and other federal agency 
securities, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) that it holds—not to mention the new assets newly 
acquired pursuant to the Fed’s pandemic relief efforts.98 Private sector 
bank balance sheets look much like the Fed’s balance sheet, save that the 
assets and liabilities include much more in the way of for-profit private 
investments and individual demand deposits, respectively, than does the 
latter.99 Migrating an IVL-like digital wallet system from Treasury to Fed 
would involve adding wallets to the liability side of the balance sheet in 
a manner well integrated with the addition of new assets to the asset side 
of the balance sheet. It would look, more or less, as follows. 
B.  How We Might Migrate 
As with the Treasury Direct Plan laid out above, so here with the Fed 
rendition there would be both functional and technical requirements to 
discharge. I will address them in the same order here as I did above. 
1.  Functional Requirements 
The functional requisites to migration of the kind here contemplated 
fall into two categories. First come the functionalities of the system qua 
payments system, which are identical to those laid out above in Part II in 
connection with the Treasury Direct Plan. Second come the 
 
 96. Id. at 18. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 20 (elaborating on the new assets now being acquired 
pursuant to the Fed’s pandemic relief efforts). 
 99. See id. at 24–25. 
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functionalities requisite to incorporating the Fed version of the plan into 
its regular monetary policy operations. Those are unique to the Fed 
rendition of the plan, so let us now turn briefly to carefully elaborating 
them. 
A FedWallet rendition of the IVL Plan would simply alter the 
compositions of the Fed’s own and private sector banks’ balance sheets 
in a few straightforward ways. First, the Fed IVL Master Account would 
simply be (a large portion of) the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet. 
Payments among businesses and individuals would then manifest as 
shifting allocations on that liability side of the Fed balance sheet (see 
Figure 5, below). Insofar as individual Fed IVL wallet accounts 
subsumed within that Fed IVL Master Account were employed in this 
manner as transaction accounts by their holders, there would also be a 
corresponding reduction in the sizes of private sector bank balance 
sheets. This would depend on what ceilings, if any, we imposed upon 
wallet account balances. Their deposit liabilities would migrate in some 
measure over to the Fed.100 
Second, insofar as we wanted private sector banks to continue to 
“gate-keep” in connection with business and other forms of productive 
lending as they do now—when not betting on price movements on 
secondary financial and tertiary derivative markets—we would permit 
them to do so in either or both of two ways. The first way would be by 
letting them offset their lending with such ordinary deposits as they can 
continue to attract or legally open. They might then elect to sell, as they 
do now, some of these loans on to the Fed ex post as they now often do 
to other federal entities such as the Government-Sponsored Enterprise 
(GSE).101 
The second way would be by letting them borrow from the Fed ex ante 
or ex post through the Fed’s Discount Window in connection with loans 
they either plan to extend or have extended—a sort of bespoke lending 
rendition of what the Fed, Fannie Mae and other GSEs, and other entities 
do in purchasing and thus monetizing bonds, notes, and other 
issuances.102 In all such cases, the effect would be simply to substitute 
liabilities owed to the Fed for liabilities owed to individual depositors on 
bank balance sheets, and add these bank liabilities to the asset side of the 
Fed’s balance sheet, thereby offsetting the new Fed Note equivalent 
liabilities that the Fed “owes” in the form of business and individual IVL 
wallet accounts.103 
 
 100. Id. at 20. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.; see also Hockett, Capital Commons, supra note 10 (detailing, in particularly 
painstaking detail, the many accounting implications of these operations). 
 103. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 20. The scare-quotes around ‘owes’ are because these 
liabilities stem from, rather than preceding and enabling, Fed loans to the ‘creditors.’ 
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Were we to go this route, requiring private sector banks to fund some 
or all of their investments through Fed Discount Window lending instead 
of privately maintained deposits could have as salutary an effect upon 
national investment policy as the Fed’s maintaining a system of IVL 
FedWallet accounts for all legal persons would have upon national 
monetary policy.104 For the Fed now could condition its lending expressly 
upon private sector banks’ lending for manifestly productive purposes in 
primary markets rather than upon speculative activity in secondary and 
tertiary markets. In effect, we would then have both (a) a renewed—and 
far more effective—Glass-Steagall separation of depository from 
speculative financial market activity, and (b) an affirmative linkage of 
that depository activity to productive investment.105 
Another asset side offset to the new currency-like liabilities that the 
Fed would take on in maintaining a system of IVL FedWallet accounts 
for businesses and individuals would be direct Fed purchases of 
infrastructure bonds, “social impact” bonds, state, and municipal 
securities (munis),106 and issuances made by any new public entity we 
might establish in future to plan and conduct national development 
finance. The possibilities here are quite breathtaking in some cases, but 
their details are beyond the scope of this Article and accordingly more 
fully discussed in other work complementing this one.107 
2.  Technical Requirements 
The technical prerequisites to digitizing Fed administered digital 
dollars and IVL wallets are, like the functional requirements other than 
monetary policy requirements, the same here as in the Treasury case. In 
other words, the same “Accounts,” “Payments,” “API,” and “Ledger” 
layers discussed in Part II above would have to be dealt with here in 
designing and instituting a Fed IVL platform for value- storage and 
 
 104. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 6; see also sources cited supra note 72. 
 105. See Hockett, supra note 49, at 11; see also sources cited supra note 72. 
 106. See sources cited supra note 105. For more of this author’s work on the Fed’s new 
Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) and QE, see Memorandum from Robert Hockett, The Fed’s 
Municipal Liquidity Facility: Present and Future Necessities and Possibilities (May 10, 2020) 
(on file with author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597732 [https:// 
perma.cc/5ZH3-E4SL]; Robert Hockett, Community QE2: Newly Eased Terms and a New Game 
Plan For Use, FORBES (May 2, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/05/ 
02/community-qe2-newly-eased-terms-and-a-new-game-plan-for-use/ [https://perma.cc/ QVU8-
H4VV]; Robert Hockett, Community QE - An April Game Plan for States and Cities, FORBES 
(Apr. 12, 2020, 8:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/04/12/community-qean-
april-game-plan-for-states-and-cities/ [https://perma.cc/PC5S-XRPJ]; Robert Hockett, Welcome 
to Community QE - Now Let Us Put It to Use, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2020, 10:21 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/04/09/welcome-to-community-qe/ [https://perma.cc 
/GRL4-C6M7]. 
 107. See sources cited supra note 106; see also sources cited supra note 72. 
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transfer. Because there is almost no difference between the two cases—
Treasury and Fed—on this dimension. and because the same federal 
offices that would do the converting at Treasury can do it at the Fed, let 
us incorporate the findings of Part II here by reference as well. 
The one difference between the two cases is that Treasury, unlike the 
Fed, already administers individual digital accounts for citizens, while 
the Fed only manages Reserve Accounts for large banking and other 
privileged financial institutions. The Fed would accordingly have to build 
out millions of IVL wallet accounts from scratch. Technically, of course, 
this need be no more daunting than it was for Treasury when it began 
Treasury Direct. Indeed, the Fed can even make use of the same personnel 
that the Treasury did when it turns to the task and can learn from any 
bugs or mistakes that the Treasury Direct project has by now brought to 
light. It will, however, take time. 
C.  Pictographic Summation and Synthesis 
Diagrammatically, then, in going the Fed route for an IVL digital 
dollar we would move from a banking system like that depicted in Figure 
3 to a banking system like that depicted in Figure 4 where credit-money 
flows and associated assets and liabilities are concerned. Adding the 
payment platform of the previous diagrams to Figure 4 yields a complete 
picture in the form of Figure 5, in connection with which the reader is 
hereby reminded that all entities represented above the Master Account 
box in the diagram are among the Account Holders, hence Payors and 
Payees, represented below that box in the diagram. 
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Figure 5: Reformed Fed/Bank/Depositor/Issuer Arrangements & 
































2020] DIGITAL GREENBACKS 33 
 
CONCLUSION 
The technology involved in the Treasury Direct upgrade, or even in 
establishing a FedWallet counterpart, will not be trivial to build, but 
neither will it be particularly daunting to build. It has been done before, 
by multiple firms and networks for multiple purposes, over the years. All 
that differs now is that we are doing this for a forthrightly public 
purpose—that of installing a universally accessible, fee-free and 
frictionless, state-of-the-art national value storage and payments 
architecture. As noted above, this is desirable in all times, not only times 
of crises. So, in doing this we will also be opening saving and paying to 
50 million unbanked and underbanked households, businesses, and 
individuals in need of immediate aid during the current crisis and any 
subsequent crises. 
As the discussion above has indicated, going the Fed route would be 
somewhat more complicated than going the Treasury route, and for that 
reason the Fed route is probably not up to the task of immediate 
implementation during the present pandemic. But in time it could be 
managed—particularly were we to start now at Treasury and then in 
future migrate to the Fed—as the Greenback paper dollar regime itself 
did in the late 19th and early 20th century. As noted above, central banks 
worldwide are already developing and rolling out CBDCs in the name of 
greater commercial inclusion, smoother payment systems, less leaky 
monetary policy, and financial stability.108 Sweden began its first public 
trial of the e-Krona project, long in development, only last February. 
China will soon follow. 
China is a particularly interesting case because it has begun more and 
more often to secure first mover advantages relative to the U.S. in 
multiple spheres of economic competition.109 Is there really any reason—
especially now, amid crisis—to cede China the advantage, or even global 
monopoly status, in this space as well? Surely there is not. Our present 
pandemic-fueled exigency requires we act quickly in any event, which 
TreasuryDirect makes quite feasible. 
  
 
 108. It bears noting that private sector entities are even now actively engaged in mastering 
the new technologies that lie behind what I propose here, thereby potentially ‘disrupting’ financial 
stability and accordingly affording us yet another reason to digitize the dollar now if we wish to 
avoid a digital rendition of the highly volatile ‘wildcat currency’ days that necessitated 
establishment of the Treasury-administered Greenback itself during the Civil War. See Hockett, 
Capital Commons, supra note 10; Hockett, supra note 31, at 228–30, for a full vetting of the 
subject. 
 109. See Robert Hockett, America’s Digital Sputnik Moment, THE HILL (May 12, 2020, 
8:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/497427-americas-digital-sputnik-moment 
[https://perma.cc/9HBW-CS5H]. 
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APPENDIX:  THE TREASURY DOLLAR ACT OF 2020 
 
A BILL 
To establish a uniform, publicly administered mechanism through 
which relief payments and other public sector disbursements can be made 
to all citizens, legal residents, and businesses legally operating within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States; and in so doing to provide the 
digital equivalent of a bank savings and transaction account to these same 
citizens, legal residents, and businesses. 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of American in Congress assembled, 
 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
 
This Act may be cited as the ‘Treasury Dollar Act of 2020.’ 
 
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. 
 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
 
(1)For over half a century from the 
mid‐1860s into the early 20th century, the 
US Treasury issued the principal legal 
tender currency used in the United States 
to settle all obligations, public and 
private; 
 
(2)After the Federal Reserve Note 
(‘dollar bills’) began first to supplement, 
then to supplant Treasury currency as the 
nation’s principal legal tender in the 
second and third decades of the 20th 
century, Treasury currency continued—
and continues—to qualify as legal tender; 
 
(3)The Treasury continues to issue 
trillions of dollars’ worth of other US 
sovereign liabilities—including Bills, 
Bonds, and Notes—which constitute the 
largest securities market in the world; 
 
(4)The Treasury is both legally and 
logistically well positioned to issue any 
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new sovereign liabilities, including zero‐
coupon, dollar denominated liabilities 
counting as legal tender, in whatever 
quantities Congress sees fit to authorize, 
be this ad hoc in crises or on a continuing 
basis; 
 
(5)The Treasury also maintains a 
system of ‘Treasury Direct’ accounts open 
to all citizens and legal residents of the 
United States, through which account‐
holders can transact in Treasury securities 
with the Treasury ‘24/7,’ any time day or 
night; 
 
(6)The United States is in need of a 
universally inclusive and efficient, ‘real 
time’ means of transmitting purchasing 
power to citizens, legal residents, and 
businesses that suffer the income and 
liquidity consequences of crisis‐wrought 
monetary, financial, and macroeconomic 
contraction; 
 
(7)Any such system as that just 
described would be both more just and 
more growth‐promoting than any less 
inclusive or less efficient system can be, 
because (a) a value storage and transfer 
architecture—that is, a savings and 
payment platform—is an essential 
public utility in any commercial society 
or exchange economy such as those of 
the United States, and (b) economic 
growth is measured by transaction 
volume, while transaction volume is a 
positive function of transaction velocity; 
 
(8)Millions of citizens and legal 
residents of, and small businesses 
operating in, the United States have 
limited or no access to traditional 
banking and payments services of the 
kind necessary both to transact with each 
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other and to receive income support, tax 
refunds, program and procurement 
payments, or other disbursements from 
the federal fisc, leaving these citizens, 
legal residents, and small businesses 
vulnerable to the exploitative practices of 
many payday lenders and payment 
service firms. 
 
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is 
to build upon the historical precedent and 
institutional architecture referenced in Findings 
(1) through (5) in order to rectify the 
deficiencies identified in findings (6) through 
(8). 
 
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS. 
 
(a) Account.— 
(b) Account Holder.— 
(c) Bank Account.— 
(d) Banking Association.— 
(e) Banking Services.— 
(f) Coupon.— 
(g) Credit and Debit Card.— 
(h) Cryptographic.— 
(i) Digital.— 
(j) Digital Account Wallet.— 
(k) Digital Equivalent.— 
(l) Digital Payment System.— 
(m) Digital Wallet.— 
(n) Disbursements.— 
(o) Dollar.— 
(p) Dollar Bill.— 
(q) E­‐Banking.— 
(r) Electronic Banking.— 




(w) Legal Tender.— 
(x) Payday Lender.— 
(y) Payment Service.— 
… 
2020] DIGITAL GREENBACKS 37 
 
 
SECTION 4. TREASURY DOLLARS. 
 
Congress shall authorize and instruct the Department of the Treasury 
to issue a new class of Treasury Bill, to be designated a ‘Treasury Dollar 
Bill,’ abbreviated as ‘Treasury Dollar.’ Treasury Dollars shall— 
 
(a) Be valued at precisely one Federal Reserve Note 
(colloquially known as ‘the dollar bill’) per Treasury 
Dollar, yielding no interest or ‘coupon’ that Federal 
Reserve Notes do not, and differing from Federal 
Reserve Notes only in respect of their issuer; 
 
(b) Be designated as Legal Tender, 
sufficient to discharge all payment obligations, 
public and private, on precisely the same terms 
as Federal Reserve Notes; 
 
(c) Be issuable in both paper and digital 
form, and any other form in which Federal 
Reserve Notes are or shall in future be issued; 
 
(d) Serve as the unit of account in Treasury 
Direct Accounts as specified in Section 5 of this 
Act. 
 
SECTION 5. TREASURY DIRECT ACCOUNTS. 
 
Congress shall authorize and instruct the Department of the Treasury 
to expand its existing system of Treasury Direct Accounts in the 
following three manners— 
 
(a) Bank and Thrift Account Interoperability.— 
All Treasury Direct Accounts shall retain the 
interoperability with Bank or Thrift Transaction 
Accounts that they currently have, save that, 
pursuant to Section 4(b) of this Act declaring 
Treasury Dollars legal tender, there shall be no 
public or private sector requirement to convert 
Treasury Dollars into Federal Reserve Notes or 
their digital equivalent, or vice versa, as there 
presently is when transferring funds between Bank 
or Thrift Transaction Accounts and Treasury 
Direct Accounts in purchasing or redeeming 
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present-day Treasury Securities that are not 
Treasury Dollars; 
 
(b) E­‐Banking, Phone Banking, Credit and 
Debit Card, Automatic Teller Machine, and Other 
Banking Services.—Pursuant to Section 4(b) of 
this Act declaring Treasury Dollars to be legal 
tender, no State or Nationally chartered Banking 
Association or Thrift Institution shall 
discriminate between Treasury Dollars and 
Federal Reserve Notes or their digital equivalent 
in administering the Electronic Banking (‘e‐
banking’), Phone or Other Device Banking, 
Credit and Debit Card, Automatic Teller Machine 
(ATM), or other traditional banking services that 
they offer customers; 
 




(1) Add digital peer­to‐peer (‘P2P’) 
Interoperability to all Treasury Direct 
Accounts, enabling all Account Holders to 
transact directly in real time both with the 
Treasury and with one another, so that 
Account Holders without Savings or 
Transaction Accounts held with other 
institutions, including Banking Associations 
and Thrift Institutions, can transact directly 
both with Treasury and with one another in 
‘real time’ through their Treasury Direct 
Account Wallets; 
 
(2) Retain the services of the US Digital 
Service to design the P2P­‐ Interoperable 
Digital Account Wallets referenced in 
Subsection (c)(1) of this Section immediately 
above; 
 
(3) Cryptographically build into the Digital 
Account Wallet system all Privacy and ‘Hack‐
Proofing’ protections that Treasury Direct 
Accounts currently offer or that Banking 
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Associations and Thrift Institutions are 
currently required by law to provide in 
connection with the Transaction Accounts and 
Payment Services that they provide. 
 
(d) Treasury Disbursements into Digital 
Account Wallets.—After the system of Digital 
Account Wallets described in Subsubsection 
(c)(e) of this Subsection is operational, Treasury 
shall make all future digital or electronic 
disbursements, including but not limited to crisis 
relief payments, into these Account Wallets, with 
the object of encouraging wide use of this system 
as the preferred, universally accessible digital 
payments platform for all e‐payments made in the 
United States. 
 
